“First they will remove the president, then the republic.” The agreement between Russia and Tatarstan has expired, what does this mean? RBC: The Kremlin does not intend to renew the federal agreement with Tatarstan Agreement between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan
On August 11, 2017, the agreement on the division of powers between federal center and the Republic of Tatarstan.
There is no new agreement and is not expected.
If this news left you cold, then, from a practical policy point of view, you may be right. After the termination of the agreement, the real pattern of relations between the two Kremlins - Moscow and Kazan - did not change in any way.
But from the point of view of legal casuistry, the event that just took place can be called epochal.
We are talking about such a cornerstone concept as the territorial integrity of Russia - about legal basis presence of Tatarstan as part of our state.
According to the Constitution of Tatarstan, the agreement on the division of powers between Moscow and Kazan is one of the three main reasons why this region is a subject of the Russian Federation.
The very first article of the basic law of the republic states: “The Republic of Tatarstan is a democratic legal state, united with the Russian Federation by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan “On the delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction and mutual delegation of powers between bodies state power Russian Federation and state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan.”
Translated from legal language into generally understandable language, this wording means or, to put it more carefully, can mean the following: since there is no longer an agreement on the division of powers between the federal center and Kazan, the presence of Tatarstan within Russia is in question.
Fortunately, legal reality does not always coincide with reality as such.
Regardless of what is written in official documents, Tatarstan will not secede from Russia today, not tomorrow, and not the day after tomorrow.
But it is also impossible to dismiss the legal conflict that has arisen as something of little significance.
We are not faced with a minor legal curiosity of interest only to amateurs constitutional law.
We are faced with the need to build a new pattern of relations between the federal center and one of the most significant and influential regions of Russia.
The old Yeltsin scheme for these relationships has just died. And Putin’s new one, despite the length of the current president’s stay in power, has not yet been built.
While on a visit to Kazan on August 6, 1990, the newly elected chairman Supreme Council RSFSR Boris Yeltsin said his fateful phrase: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.” Yeltsin’s kind hosts, among whom Mintimer Shaimiev, who then held the position of head of the local regional committee of the CPSU, played the leading role, took full advantage of this invitation.
During the period of sharp weakening of the central power structures, which coincided with Yeltsin's rule, Tatarstan, under the leadership of Shaimiev, set a course to maximize its independence.
Pay attention to the first article of the basic law of the republic quoted above: “Tatarstan is a state united with the Russian Federation.”
Pay attention - and compare with the basic law of our other republic, whose leadership during Yeltsin’s time was also very successful in putting pressure on the federal center: “The Republic of Bashkortostan is democratic rule of law within the Russian Federation."
Do you feel the difference?
During the Yeltsin period of our history, the political elite in Kazan did everything so that Moscow would constantly “feel the difference” between Tatarstan and other Russian regions.
In December 1993, the republic actually boycotted the referendum on the adoption of the new Constitution of Russia.
Voter turnout in Tatarstan was less than 15%. And in one of the districts with a population of thirty thousand people, only three voters came to the polling stations.
Similarly, elections to the new federal parliament failed in Tatarstan.
The republic sent its envoys to the State Duma and the Federation Council only after the signing in February 1994 of the first agreement on the division of powers between Moscow and Kazan.
But even after the signing of this agreement, Mintemir Shaimiev made it clear in various ways: Tatarstan is something more than an ordinary subject of the Russian Federation.
A small but colorful example. The name KGB disappeared from official use in Moscow in the fall of 1991. But in Tatarstan the KGB continued to exist until the spring of 2001.
The constant play of Shaimiev’s team on the brink – or, as some believe, even a little over the brink – cannot necessarily be considered evidence of separatist sentiments among the republic’s leadership.
In the 90s, nimble regional leaders often used subpolitical threats as leverage to wrest economic preferences from the federal center.
For example, how the first president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, extorted from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin the right to create a free economic zone.
I quote Aushev’s story to his friend and biographer Vladimir Snerigrev: “I had already become a little experienced in the corridors of power, I knew that it was better not to approach the matter right away, it was better to first prepare the interlocutor. Therefore, he began from afar: “Viktor Stepanovich, we are in trouble.” It’s really bad: there is no money, the refugees spent the winter without a roof over their heads. Give us some from the master's table.
But everyone then came to Chernomyrdin with exactly the same talk, so the answer was predetermined: “I have no money.” Don't ask and don't hope.
Then I slightly blackmailed him: “If you don’t give me money, then give me independence.”
He raised his eyebrows in surprise and even stood up from the table: “Go, you know where!” One Dudayev is enough for us.
Yeah, now you can play trump cards: - Viktor Stepanovich, the center has no money and is not expected to. Allow us to earn them ourselves. For a common cause. - How is that? “Yes, here’s one idea.”
I don’t know whether Shaimiev’s team’s appetites were limited to “blackmailing” the federal center or whether Kazan under Yeltsin had broader ambitions. But the fact is that the Yeltsin era is over, and under Putin, Tatarstan began to gradually be “returned to operation.”
In 2006, Putin and Shaimiev, however, signed new agreement on the division of powers between Moscow and Kazan. But even then they gave a clear hint to the leadership of Tatarstan: things won’t go any further.
After the signature of the GDP appeared on the agreement, such an absolutely obedient body as the Federation Council suddenly “revolted” and voted against it. The document was approved only when the president and The State Duma together overcame the veto of the Federation Council.
And in the summer of 2017, Tatarstan was left without an agreement on the division of powers.
How to get out of this situation? I am opposed to any manifestations of separatism and attempts by individual regions to gain semi-independent status for themselves. There is another argument against signing a new agreement on the division of powers.
For similar document Now there is simply no “filling”:
Unlike past times, all issues of relations between the center and the regions are now regulated federal laws.
But at the same time, I am convinced: Moscow must avoid any actions that can be characterized as humiliation of Tatarstan or a manifestation of disrespect for it.
For eastern - and not only eastern - societies this is not just important, but extremely important.
The federal center and the leadership of Tatarstan must jointly find a compromise, popular and legally verified solution.
Judging by my conversations with experts in the Kazan political backstage, officials in Moscow and Kazan already understand the contours of such a decision.
I will not go into details that are interesting and even understandable only to lawyers. The main thing is that compromise is both possible and highly desirable.
The federal center and Tatarstan managed not to quarrel in the “dashing” 90s. In the “stable” tenths, they especially do not have such a right.
From now on, Tatarstan’s legal status as part of the Russian Federation may be in question
On August 11, 2017, the agreement on the division of powers between the federal center and the Republic of Tatarstan expired. There is no new agreement and is not expected. If this news left you cold, then, from a practical policy point of view, you may be right. After the termination of the agreement, the real pattern of relations between the two Kremlins - Moscow and Kazan - did not change in any way. But from the point of view of legal casuistry, the event that just took place can be called epochal. We are talking about such a cornerstone concept as the territorial integrity of Russia - about the legal basis for Tatarstan being part of our state.
According to the Constitution of Tatarstan, the agreement on the division of powers between Moscow and Kazan is one of the three main reasons why this region is a subject of the Russian Federation. The very first article of the fundamental law of the republic states: “The Republic of Tatarstan is a democratic legal state, united with the Russian Federation by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan” On the delimitation of jurisdiction and mutual delegation of powers between government bodies of the Russian Federation and bodies state power of the Republic of Tatarstan.”
Translated from legal language into generally understandable language, this wording means or, to put it more carefully, can mean the following: since there is no longer an agreement on the division of powers between the federal center and Kazan, the presence of Tatarstan within Russia is in question. Fortunately, legal reality does not always coincide with reality as such. Regardless of what is written in official documents, Tatarstan will not secede from Russia today, not tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. But it is also impossible to dismiss the legal conflict that has arisen as something of little significance.
We are not faced with a minor legal curiosity of interest only to lovers of constitutional law. We are faced with the need to build a new pattern of relations between the federal center and one of the most significant and influential regions of Russia. The old Yeltsin scheme for these relationships has just died. And Putin’s new one, despite the length of the current president’s stay in power, has not yet been built.
While on a visit to Kazan on August 6, 1990, the newly elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Boris Yeltsin, said his fateful phrase: “Take as much sovereignty as you can stomach.” Yeltsin’s kind hosts, among whom Mintimer Shaimiev, who then held the position of head of the local regional committee of the CPSU, played the leading role, took full advantage of this invitation. During the period of sharp weakening of the central power structures, which coincided with Yeltsin's rule, Tatarstan, under the leadership of Shaimiev, set a course to maximize its independence.
Pay attention to the first article of the basic law of the republic quoted above: “Tatarstan is a state united with the Russian Federation.” Pay attention and compare with the basic law of our other republic, whose leadership during Yeltsin’s time was also very successful in putting pressure on the federal center: “The Republic of Bashkortostan is a democratic legal state within the Russian Federation.” Do you feel the difference? During the Yeltsin period of our history, the political elite in Kazan did everything so that Moscow would constantly “feel the difference” between Tatarstan and other Russian regions. In December 1993, the republic actually boycotted the referendum on the adoption of the new Constitution of Russia. Voter turnout in Tatarstan was less than 15%. And in one of the districts with a population of thirty thousand people, only three voters came to the polling stations. Similarly, elections to the new federal parliament failed in Tatarstan. The republic sent its envoys to the State Duma and the Federation Council only after the signing in February 1994 of the first agreement on the division of powers between Moscow and Kazan.
But even after the signing of this agreement, Mintemir Shaimiev made it clear in various ways: Tatarstan is something more than an ordinary subject of the Russian Federation. A small but colorful example. The name KGB disappeared from official use in Moscow in the fall of 1991. But in Tatarstan the KGB continued to exist until the spring of 2001. The constant play of Shaimiev’s team on the brink – or, as some believe, even a little over the brink – cannot necessarily be considered evidence of separatist sentiments among the republic’s leadership. In the 90s, nimble regional leaders often used subpolitical threats as leverage to wrest economic preferences from the federal center.
Here, for example, is how the first president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, extorted from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin the right to create a free economic zone in his republic. I quote Aushev’s story to his friend and biographer Vladimir Snerigrev: “I had already become a little experienced in the corridors of power, I knew that it was better not to approach the matter right away, it was better to first prepare the interlocutor. Therefore, he began from afar: “Viktor Stepanovich, we are in trouble.” It’s really bad: there is no money, the refugees spent the winter without a roof over their heads. Give us some from the master's table.
But everyone then came to Chernomyrdin with exactly the same talk, so the answer was predetermined: “I have no money.” Don't ask and don't hope. Then I slightly blackmailed him: “If you don’t give me money, then give me independence.” He raised his eyebrows in surprise and even stood up from the table: “Go, you know where!” One Dudayev is enough for us. Stop talking like this. Forget! - and also added a few unprintable, but very expressive words. But, I see, I got excited. Yeah, now you can play trump cards: - Viktor Stepanovich, the center has no money and is not expected to. Allow us to earn them ourselves. For a common cause. - How is that? “Yes, here’s one idea.”
I don’t know whether Shaimiev’s team’s appetites were limited to “blackmailing” the federal center or whether Kazan under Yeltsin had broader ambitions. But the fact is that the Yeltsin era is over, and under Putin, Tatarstan began to gradually be “returned to operation.” In 2006, Putin and Shaimiev, however, signed a new agreement on the division of powers between Moscow and Kazan. But even then they gave a clear hint to the leadership of Tatarstan: things won’t go any further. After the signature of the GDP appeared on the agreement, such an absolutely obedient body as the Federation Council suddenly “revolted” and voted against it. The document was approved only when the President and the State Duma together overcame the veto of the Federation Council.
And in the summer of 2017, Tatarstan was left without an agreement on the division of powers. How to get out of this situation? I am opposed to any manifestations of separatism and attempts by individual regions to gain semi-independent status for themselves. There is another argument against signing a new agreement on the division of powers. There is simply no “filling” for such a document now: Unlike past times, all issues of relations between the center and the regions are now regulated by federal laws. But at the same time, I am convinced: Moscow must avoid any actions that can be characterized as humiliation of Tatarstan or a manifestation of disrespect for it.
Kazan should be given the opportunity to “save face.” For eastern - and not only eastern - societies this is not just important, but extremely important. The federal center and the leadership of Tatarstan must jointly find a compromise, popular and legally verified solution. Judging by my conversations with experts in the Kazan political backstage, officials in Moscow and Kazan already understand the contours of such a decision. I will not go into details that are interesting and even understandable only to lawyers. The main thing is that compromise is both possible and highly desirable. The federal center and Tatarstan managed not to quarrel in the “dashing” 90s. In the “stable” tenths, they especially do not have such a right.
The Kremlin does not intend to create a legal commission in connection with the expiration of the agreement on the division of powers with Tatarstan, sources told RBC. Deputies of the Republican State Council previously asked the Russian President about this
Kazan Kremlin (Photo: Sergey Fadeichev / TASS)
There will be no commission
On Friday, August 11, the agreement on the division of powers between Russia and Tatarstan expired. The document came into force on August 11, 2007, and was valid for ten years. The Kremlin will not renew the document, nor will it conclude a new one, RBC sources previously reported. The position of the federal center has remained unchanged since then, a federal official and an interlocutor close to the Kremlin told RBC.
The federal center also does not intend to create a commission on legal issues in connection with the expiration of the agreement, the same sources told RBC. There is no need for such a commission - the existing legal conflicts relate to the Constitution of Tatarstan and the republic is able to resolve them itself, says a federal official to RBC. The creation of a commission is a technical issue; all the necessary changes can be made within the framework of existing institutions, so there is no need to create another one, added an RBC interlocutor close to the Kremlin.
Deputies of the State Council of Tatarstan asked President Vladimir Putin to create a special commission to develop proposals on legal issues on July 11. Its necessity was justified by the fact that in connection with the expiration of the agreement on the division of powers, “certain problems arise in the implementation” of a number of norms of the republican Constitution.
We are talking about the first article of the Constitution of Tatarstan, which states that relations between the republic and Russia are built, among other things, on the basis of an agreement on the division of powers. This article “cannot be changed by parliament, but only in a referendum,” Chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan Farid Mukhametshin told RBC. “This is the legal side of the issue, and it requires a calm, respectful and confidential discussion between the federal center and the subject,” he added.
If the issue is put to a referendum, it is obvious that the majority of the republic’s residents will vote against changing this article, said an RBC source close to the republic’s leadership.
“We would like the federal center to decide on representatives who would come to Kazan, or we are ready to send our representatives to Moscow,” Mukhametshin said. According to him, he hopes that after the “leading lawyers of the presidential administration return from vacation” such consultations will really begin.
Another interlocutor close to the republic’s leadership clarifies that the delay in starting consultations by the republican authorities was explained by the vacation of the presidential assistant, head of the Kremlin’s state and legal department, Larisa Brycheva.
In 1994, Tatarstan became the first region with which an agreement on the division of powers was concluded, and until today it remained the last entity to have such an agreement. In the first document, the republic received economic preferences, for example, the right to levy its own taxes, create its own National Bank, resolve issues of ownership, use and disposal natural resources, which, according to the agreement, were “the exclusive property and property of the people of Tatarstan.” The 2007 agreement no longer contained economic preferences. The authorities of the republic were given the right to issue passports with an insert “for state language Republic of Tatarstan (Tatar) and with the image of the state emblem of the Republic of Tatarstan.” At the same time, in paragraph 1 of Art. 2 of the document states that in accordance with the Constitution of Russia and the Constitution of the Republic, “Tatarstan (state) - a subject of the Russian Federation - has full state power beyond the jurisdiction” and the powers of Russia “on subjects of joint jurisdiction.”
They will leave the president
The federal center may meet the republican authorities halfway on another issue—preserving the position of “president” for the head of Tatarstan. With a request to “support the preservation of the existing name of the highest official“The State Council of the Republic spoke in July.
However, the title “president” can only be retained until the end of the term of office of the head of the republic, Rustam Minnikhanov. “The post of president will remain until the next elections [of the head of Tatarstan], since citizens elected the president,” a source in the Kremlin told RBC. Minnikhanov's powers expire in 2020.
Rustam Minnikhanov (Photo: Alexey Nikolsky / TASS)
Kommersant previously reported the readiness of the federal center to retain the current name of the head of the republic.
Tatarstan is the only republic where the position of “president” has been preserved. According to the law “On general principles organization of legislative and executive bodies state power of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation", the name "president" national republics should have been abolished by 2015. Later, the law was extended until January 1, 2016 - especially for Tatarstan, which never renamed the president as head. However, even after the law was extended, no changes occurred.
“The leadership of the republic must hear the signal that was given by President Putin. The signal is absolutely clear - that all entities must follow the law,” a federal official told RBC.
At the annual press conference in December 2015, the head of state said that “even Chechnya said: no, we should have one president in our country, but we will do it differently in relation to the first person.” However, Putin added that “we will respect any choice of the people of Tatarstan.” “So you decide for yourself there, okay?” - he suggested.
Gift to Shaimiev
In itself, the agreement on the division of powers was not a significant problem and was of a symbolic nature - Tatarstan continued to establish its uniqueness, and this was projected, among other things, onto the leader of the republic, says political scientist Vitaly Ivanov. The current agreement was essentially a gift to Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev for his 70th birthday, which he celebrated in 2007, the expert continues. “Thus, Shaimiev was allowed to continue to believe that he was special. But the attitude towards Minnikhanov is different. He is not Shaimiev. Despite all the nuances, this is an ordinary Putin governor,” the expert states.
As for the possibility of maintaining the position of “president” until the expiration of Minnikhanov’s term of office, then, according to Ivanov, this issue was resolved back in 2016, when Tatarstan did not change the name of the head of the republic. “Now this issue is urgently being brought up to give Minnikhanov an opportunity to save face,” the expert is sure.
In 1994, when the first agreement on the division of powers was adopted, the situation in the country was completely different - the document played the role of a stabilizer in relations between the federal center and the republic, it also spelled out economic preferences, said Andrei Bolshakov, head of the department of conflictology at Kazan Federal University. The current agreement did not contain economic preferences, but it did spell out political things that are important for the Tatar elite. “It was said that the republic has a president who must speak two languages. This is very important for bilingual Tatarstan,” the expert explained. But the federal center has strengthened and is now not going to build relations on a contractual basis, he concluded.
Emerging legal issues issues relating to the first article of the Constitution of Tatarstan will most likely be resolved through negotiations rather than a referendum. “The leadership of Tatarstan is not interested in a referendum and will try to agree on consultations. But, in my opinion, legal experts, and not high-ranking officials, will participate in them,” Bolshakov is sure.
However, if the federal center had extended the agreement, then nothing terrible would have happened. “Politically, this (extension of the document) was possible. The Tatars are the second largest people in Russia, and some aspects of the agreement could be present,” the expert believes.
IA SakhaNews. Deputies of the State Council of Tatarstan asked the Russian leader Vladimir Putin to preserve the agreement on the division of powers between the federal center and the republic, and also to retain the title of the position “president,” said the chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan Farid Mukhametshin, reports TASS.
“The agreement allowed us to stabilize the situation both in the country and in Tatarstan. It became mandatory for all structures, including federal ones, both on the territory of Tatarstan and in the Russian Federation. We receive many proposals from other constituent entities of the Russian Federation, Tatars living compactly there “that the agreement played an exceptional role in stabilizing the generally difficult situation in the 90s. Overall, it shows the level of federalism that has reached in the Russian Federation,”- explained Mukhametshin, adding that this agreement is an example of how it is possible to find solutions to emerging problems in the development of multinational Russia.
The Kremlin does not want to renew the agreement on the division of powers between Russia and Tatarstan, a federal official told RBC and confirmed a source close to the presidential administration. The scenario of extending the old contract or concluding a new one is not being considered, noted RBC’s first interlocutor.
The republic’s authorities do not agree with the Kremlin’s position and are trying to challenge it, says an RBC interlocutor close to the presidential administration. Ideally, the republic’s authorities would like the document to be preserved in one form or another, but, knowing that the federal center is not ready for this, “they are trying to negotiate preferences for themselves,” says a federal official.
In particular, according to him, the issue of the current name of the highest official of Tatarstan has not yet been resolved. The fact is that this is the only republic in the Russian Federation whose leader is called “president,” while the other republics have “heads.” In addition, there is a problem of disproportionate representation of people of Tatar and Russian nationalities in the authorities of the republic, adds RBC’s interlocutor.
The agreement “On the delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between state authorities of the Russian Federation and state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan” was signed on June 26, 2007 by the Presidents of Russia and Tatarstan Vladimir Putin and Mintimer Shaimiev for a period of 10 years. His term expires on July 24, 2017.
The agreement, among other things, states that Tatarstan, within its powers, carries out international and foreign economic relations with subjects and administrative-territorial entities foreign countries, participates in the activities of bodies of international organizations specially created for these purposes, and also enters into agreements on the implementation of international and foreign economic relations in agreement with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Agreement “On the delimitation of jurisdiction and mutual delegation of powers between government bodies of the Russian Federation and government bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan” was signed on February 15, 1994.
Illustration copyright TASS/ALEKSEI NIKOLSKIY Image caption Putin and Shaimiev have already agreed that the agreement will not be extended, BBC sources say
On Friday, the agreement on the division of powers between Russia and Tatarstan expired. He had not given any special powers to the republic for a long time, but for a long time he allowed the local leadership to feel on an equal footing with Moscow.
For several more weeks, representatives of the Tatar elite discussed the fate of relations between Moscow and Kazan at the world congress of the Tatar Congress. In the resolution of the congress, the delegates asked to retain the position of president of the republic (head of other Russian regions cannot be called president), and also emphasized the importance of extending the agreement on the division of powers.
Former Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev convinced those gathered that Kazan was discussing all these issues “with representatives of the federal center.” “We are now exchanging views on these issues. I think we will find a common language,” he said.
However, a week later, the Kremlin did not make a single public statement that would in any way clarify the fate of the agreement, which was so important for the Tatar elite.
“The position will be formulated on this issue. And it will be announced accordingly, we will inform you,” Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov dryly answered reporters when asked about the agreement on July 12.
All expired on Friday possible timing, when it could be considered that the agreement is in force, but silence reigns in the public space.
There will be no agreement
It is already clear that despite the appeals of the Tatar leaders public opinion and non-public lobbying in favor of preserving the treaty, the Kremlin did not make concessions.
In mid-July, several days apart, the publications RBC and Kommersant, citing their sources, reported that the Kremlin refused to preserve the agreement on special powers for Tatarstan. At the same time, the Kremlin is ready to retain the post of president of the republic until 2020.
An interlocutor of the BBC Russian Service in the Kremlin confirmed this information: “The agreement ends and that’s it. The position of president in the republic remains until the next elections [of the leadership of the republic in 2020].”
Such an agreement was reached at a meeting between Putin and the first president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, at the end of April, when he was awarded the title of Hero of Labor, a source close to the Kremlin, who was not authorized to comment to the media, told the BBC in July.
In April, Putin received the current president of the republic, Rustam Minnikhanov. Officially, the Kremlin press service reported that one of the main issues of the meeting was the banking crisis in Tatarstan, as a result of which the Central Bank revoked the licenses of several large regional banks.
A BBC interlocutor close to the Kremlin says that all representatives of Tatarstan in federal bodies authorities - for example, State Duma deputies or members of the Federation Council - were given the task of expressing Kazan’s public position in the media on preserving the existing treaty.
On July 11, deputies of the State Council of Tatarstan turned to Vladimir Putin with a request to extend the agreement between federal authorities and region.
“We call for an extension of the agreement so as not to disturb people. We would like it to exist,” Speaker of the State Council of Tatarstan Farid Mukhametshin told reporters.
Illustration copyright TASS/ALEKSANDR SENTSOV Image caption In 1994, Tatarstan received the right to its own constitution, citizenship and foreign policyWhy is it important for Tatarstan?
The agreement on the division of powers once gave the republic greater independence, but gradually acquired symbolic significance.
The issue of special status arose since the “parade of sovereignties”: in 1992, Tatarstan and Chechnya became two republics that refused to sign an agreement on federal structure countries.
Two years later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the head of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev signed the agreement “On the delimitation of areas of competence and mutual delegation of powers.”
Under this agreement, Kazan received exclusive right manage land, resources, create a system of government agencies, form a budget, have their own citizenship and even form their own international policy.
Vladimir Putin, who became president after Yeltsin, consistently opposed the excessive independence of regional authorities.
In August 2000, having recently been elected to his first presidential term, Putin compared the inadequacy of federal and local laws with a time bomb that "must be removed and destroyed."
From that moment on, the Kremlin began the struggle to eliminate special statuses.
In 2003, a law was passed according to which all agreements between Moscow and the regions had to be re-approved by federal laws.
Tatarstan began to lose symbolic rights: for example, the provisions according to which the president of the republic must be bilingual, as well as the existence of a separate “citizenship of Tatarstan,” were declared unconstitutional.
In the mid-2000s to fight against special status The republic was joined by the plenipotentiary mission of the Russian President in the Volga region. The head of the embassy at that time was Sergei Kiriyenko. With his participation, a new treaty was written, according to which the republic had even less powers.
After long discussions, it was possible to sign it only in 2007. For another 10 years, Kazan received the right to make decisions on the economic, environmental, cultural and other features of Tatarstan “in cooperation with the center.”
What will happen next?
Now the same Kiriyenko, as the first deputy head of the presidential administration, is responsible in the Kremlin, including for issues of regional policy - that is, he was among those who made the decision not to renew the agreement.
Speaking for the extension, representatives of the Tatar elite have repeatedly emphasized: its necessity is spelled out in the Constitution of the republic, and to cancel the treaty means to change the Constitution. And changes can be made to the republican constitution only after a referendum.
Everyone understands that the topic is closed, and now they are just looking for a suitable one legal form, said a BBC source familiar with the negotiations, but not authorized to speak publicly on this issue. The Kremlin has already made it clear: there will be no agreement, only the post of president will remain. Next, he must make it clear to Tatarstan that there is no need to change the constitution of the republic.
“The Constitution of Tatarstan says that relations with Russia are built on the basis of the Constitution of Russia, the Constitution of Tatarstan and the agreement on the division of powers. The latter no longer exists, and changes to this clause can only be made through a referendum. But this is not necessary,” - says the interlocutor of the BBC Russian Service.
Formally, the expiration of the agreement will not change anything in Moscow’s relations: the agreement was emasculated 10 years ago, says political strategist Abbas Gallyamov.
“However, Tatarstan is suffering a serious symbolic defeat - it is demonstratively placed in line with other regions. Until now, the residents of Tatarstan were proud of the fact that they are not like everyone else. They are the only ones who managed to preserve the agreement, the only ones with whom Moscow has to reckon with, lead negotiations. What’s especially bad is that the republic’s leadership suffered this symbolic defeat immediately after the banking crisis,” the expert says.
“Such a double blow will provoke an increase in discontent and irritation - both with the Kremlin and with its own leadership. Perhaps this will have an impact already during the voting in the presidential elections,” says Gallyamov.
The liquidation of the agreement is natural; it would be extremely strange if this did not happen, says Fyodor Krasheninnikov, president of the Institute for the Development and Modernization of Public Relations, to the BBC.
“If in the late 1990s Shaimiev, Rakhimov, Rossel and some others were considered heavyweights, then it turned out that at the first whistle they surrendered their sovereignty, following other regions,” continues Krasheninnikov.
Apart from the leader of Chechnya, who has his own armed forces, all other governors have essentially become officials of the presidential administration. According to the political scientist, there will be no bargaining between the Kremlin and the leadership of the region: “The most expensive gift for them is preserving what they have now.”