Armed forces of the republic of georgia. Georgian Armed Forces: weapons and military equipment
Since its creation, the Georgian armed forces have had to go through a very difficult path. After the breakup Soviet Union its constituent republics received the right to become absolutely independent from the central government. Instead of one large state mechanism operating harmoniously in one direction, several smaller ones were formed, the guidelines of which were significantly different. To successfully defend its beliefs, every country needs a strong army. It is for this reason that the young states are seriously concerned about their own combat effectiveness. Georgia was no exception, whose army, as it turned out, was in a deplorable state. This deficiency had to be corrected, which is what the Georgians did in subsequent years. You will learn about the history of formation, structure, military equipment and Georgia in this article.
Acquaintance
Georgia is a state military organization, created in April 1991. At the end of this month the first call was made. It was assumed that the size of the Georgian army would not initially exceed 900 soldiers. However, during the first conscription, almost 8 thousand expressed a desire to serve. The army’s task is to ensure political decisions in the defense field, identify threats, support military formations in a high degree of combat readiness, and carry out tasks taking into account Georgia’s international obligations. Due to the lack of sufficient money in the country's budget, the army was initially in very poor condition. Soon, in order to strengthen the Armed Forces, the government increased the defense budget, which made it possible to carry out a number of large-scale reforms, purchase weapons, uniforms, etc.
1992
A year after the formation of the armed forces, the situation in the Georgian army had improved so much that, as a result of another intensified political confrontation between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian Supreme Council the government decided to send its troops into Abkhazia. The fighting had varying degrees of success and lasted just over a year. Violations of human rights (mostly civil) have become widespread. In 1993, the UN Mission published facts for which both warring parties were responsible. In September 1993, the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was ended. In 1994, both sides signed a ceasefire agreement in Moscow. The conflict has left vast areas devastated and hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced.
2008
By this time, military construction was carried out with increased intensity. In order to increase the combat capability of the state, the military-political leadership paid a lot of attention to financing the defense industry. Compared to 2005, the defense budget has increased 30 times. It amounted to almost 10% of the GDP level. According to experts, a lot of money was received this country from Western creditors. The United States and Türkiye have become places for professional training for officers and enlisted personnel. Many instructors came to Georgia itself for this purpose. We purchased weapons and military equipment from the USA, Turkey and Ukraine. Georgia increased the number of personnel from 32 to 37 thousand people. It was planned that 90% of them would soon serve on a contract basis. The uniform of the Georgian army is a NATO model.
Result
At that time, many military experts assessed the Georgian army as one of the most combat-ready in the post-Soviet space. Structurally, the Armed Forces were equipped with ground forces, air forces and naval forces. In service there were 200 T-55 and T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles of the first and second models (78 units), combat reconnaissance vehicles (11 units) and armored personnel carriers (91 units). In addition, the army owned various caliber barrel artillery (200 guns) and 180 mortars. Georgia also possessed forty multiple launch rocket systems. Three Mi-24 attack helicopters, as well as Su-25 KM attack aircraft (10 units) modernized by the Israeli company Elbit Sydtem, were ready to destroy the target from the air. Georgia also had 6 Bell-212 transport helicopters and 6 American UH-1H.
"Five Day War"
In July 2008, the conflict between Georgia and the self-proclaimed republics reached its climax. In an effort to establish control over the entire territory, the authorities resorted to forceful method. Supported by the United States, as well as its allies, the Georgian Armed Forces would certainly achieve what they wanted. Only Russia could protect the republics from the invasion of the Georgian army. Considering the fact that the South Ossetian army was less equipped with both personnel (3 thousand people and 15 thousand in reserve) and weapons, Georgia’s victory was guaranteed. As Russian experts predicted, if Georgian troops succeed in implementing the first stage, fighting in the future they will spread to Abkhazia.
On August 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a “peace enforcement operation.” Of course, it was possible to restore order in the region through a full-scale Russian invasion. However, such a method would entail a serious aggravation in the foreign policy arena. The President of the Russian Federation considered that it would be more expedient to provide indirect military assistance to the republics. Therefore, additional peacekeeping forces and volunteer formations arrived in the conflict zone. The armies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have had a difficult time fighting the Georgian Armed Forces without help from the Russians. Over five days of fierce fighting, the Georgian army lost about 3 thousand people. The war ended on August 12, but had economic and geopolitical consequences for Georgia. Namely: Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and Georgia’s entry into NATO was postponed indefinitely.
Our days
Today, 37 thousand people serve in the Georgian Armed Forces. Their number is determined by the National Security Council. The armed forces are subordinate to the General Staff, which, in turn, is subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The General Staff is headed by Vladimir Chachibay as a brigadier general. The Defense Department is headed by Levan Izoria. The army consists primarily of contract soldiers. Conscripts are engaged in logistics and security of strategically important facilities. Military service for one year is considered mandatory, after which young people can continue to serve for another four years, but on a contract basis. According to experts, the Georgian Armed Forces are distinguished by a diverse and complex structure, which is represented by the Eastern and Western Commands of the Ground Forces, Special Forces, National Guard and Aviation. Since 1994, the state has been moving towards NATO. Since that time, the country's military development has been carried out in accordance with NATO standards. Despite the tragic events of 2008, the North Atlantic Alliance has repeatedly expressed approval of the decisions of the military command and leadership of Georgia, who still hope that sooner or later they will be accepted.
About ground forces
Ground forces or ground forces in the Georgian armed forces are the only type. SV military personnel act independently. If necessary, they can coordinate their actions with special operations forces (MTR). The main tactical unit of this type of Georgian armed forces is the brigade.
There are 10 of them in total: infantry (5 brigades), artillery (2) and one each for aviation, engineering and air defense. Also, the combat strength of the ground forces is represented by five separate battalions: two light infantry, a communications battalion, an electronic warfare battalion and a medical battalion.
Total number The army consists of 37 thousand military personnel. Military service in the Georgian army was reduced from 15 months to one year.
About SV aviation
It is a military branch of the Georgian armed forces as part of the ground forces. Aviation is represented by a separate aviation brigade and a separate helicopter base. According to military experts, technically Georgian aviation operates in the same way as those abolished after the tragic events of 2008. The task of this type is to carry out reconnaissance and provide air support to ground units.
MTR
Through Georgia, reconnaissance is carried out and counter-terrorism operations are carried out. Structurally, the MTR is a brigade formation and consists of a group of fighters who are directly subordinate to the chief of the joint headquarters of the Georgian army.
About the National Guard
The National Guard (NG) is the backbone of the reserve of the Georgian Armed Forces. Through this military branch, important strategic objects are protected, mass unrest is suppressed, and the consequences of emergencies are eliminated.
About weapons
According to experts, American M4A1 and M4A3 rifles are used as the main small arms in the Georgian army (photo below in the article). In addition, AK (74th model and its modernization), Heckler & Koch, UMP 45, As Val, TAR-21 and Micro Galil assault rifles are used. Armored vehicles are represented by the Oplot, T-55 and T-72 tanks. The Georgian military has at its disposal BMP-1, BMP-2, armored personnel carriers (70th and 80th models), Nurol Ejder and Otocar Cobra. Georgian military personnel also use American Cougar and Hamvee armored personnel carriers. The state military scientific and technical center "Delta" is designing Didgori armored vehicles. Since on this moment They are only being tested; their supply to the country’s army has not yet been established. Artillery weapons are represented by several types of artillery mounts: multiple launch rocket systems (RM-70, IMI Grand-LAR, M63 Plamen, DRS-122, IMI Lynx, M-87 Orkan, VM-21 and BM-30 Smerch), self-propelled artillery and towed artillery installations. According to military experts, the Georgian army has a small military aircraft fleet. At the moment, Soviet planes and helicopters are predominantly used in Georgia. There are also Aerostat, Elbit Skylark and Hermes drones. Since 2010, the country has established the production of unmanned aerial vehicles. Air defense is carried out by Soviet and Ukrainian Buk-M1, S-125 Tor missle system, Strela-10 9K35, Osa-AKM and Israeli Spyder-SR/MR installations. Since 2016, the country's army has been intensively reformed.
A decision was made in the near future to completely abandon Soviet small arms and Russian production. The same fate, as stated by the Ministry of Defense L. Izoria, awaits combat aircraft. The attention of the Georgian military is focused primarily on drones. The goal pursued by the military command is to begin to meet NATO standards as quickly as possible.
"Worthy partner 2018"
After the Ukrainian-American naval exercises Sea Breeze 2018, NATO began new maneuvers in Georgia in the Black Sea. The United States, Great Britain, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, France, Norway, Poland, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Armenia took part, the Ministry of Defense said. The total number of military personnel was over three thousand. According to security officials, the goal of the “Worthy Partner 2018” exercise is to improve defense skills, combat readiness and compatibility of the Georgian armed forces with NATO, the United States and its allies. Experts argue that the primary task of the Americans and NATO is to gain control in the south of the Caucasus. In the future, when they have to build new political relations with Eurasia, dominance in this most important hub region will make it possible to control Iran and the Russian North Caucasus.
"Foreign Military Review" No. 5. 2006 (pp. 9-14)
ARMED FORCES OF GEORGIA: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT
Colonel A. PAKHOMYCHEV,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Sciences; Colonel B. TASHLYKOV
Georgia celebrated its national holiday - Day of Restoration of State Independence - on May 26. To your main thing national holiday Georgian society approached, having experienced significant events over 15 years - several “revolutions” took place in the country, more like palace coups. The so-called democratic transformations actually led to the disintegration of Georgia on ethnic grounds, the destruction of previously established economic ties with the constituent entities of the Caucasus region, the aggravation of energy, food, transport and other problems, the impoverishment of the masses with large-scale corruption at the top of Georgian society and the intensification of migration processes.
At the same time, significant changes occurred in the field of defense construction during this period. The current leadership of Georgia, headed by President M. Saakashvili, having taken a course towards restoring the territorial integrity of the state by any means, pays constant attention to strengthening the military power of the state. In October 2005, as noted in the ARMS-TASS report dated November 25, 2005, the Concept was adopted in Georgia national security, according to which the country’s strategic partners are the USA, Ukraine, Türkiye and the EU. Russia is the last one mentioned on the list as a “partner” of the republic.
The construction of Georgia's armed forces is carried out taking into account the priorities of the political course of the country's leadership, aimed at integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and with their direct participation. This is evidenced by a significant increase in funding for defense programs designed to bring the national army to NATO standards. From 2001 to 2003 alone, according to the yearbook "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS" (2006), the country's total military spending more than doubled - from 17 to 36 million dollars. Subsequently, despite the difficult socio-economic situation of the country, spending on military needs increased at a faster pace. Thus, in 2005, the level of military funding exceeded 2.5 percent of GDP and reached $167 million. In 2006, the country's military budget will be about $216 million.
According to the data on its military expenditures submitted by Georgia to the UN, the first place in the budget structure is the item “Purchases of weapons and military equipment” (40 percent). A slightly smaller amount of funding is provided for the maintenance of personnel (35 percent). Share of expenses for combat training and logistics support of troops is small (15 percent), which is explained by off-budget expenditures for these purposes under foreign military assistance programs. Up to 10 percent is allocated for the construction of military facilities. military budget.
The budget of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs is not far behind the defense budget. Thus, in the period from 2002 to the present, it increased by 100 million dollars and for 2006 it is planned in the amount of 122 million. The budgets of the ministry are closed state security and intelligence service.
In total, more than $335 million was allocated for defense and law enforcement activities in Georgia- a fifth of the country's state budget.
About significance extrabudgetary funds, coming to the disposal of the Georgian Defense Ministry in the form of military assistance from other countries, these figures indicate. In 2002-2004, $64 million was spent as part of the US Training and Equipping program, according to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS. During the implementation of the program, American instructors (special forces and marines) trained four battalions (560 military personnel each) and a mechanized company (180 people). These formations were preparing to carry out tasks in mountainous and wooded areas, in the city and on the sea coast. Subsequently, a significant part of the American-trained personnel of the Georgian Armed Forces took part in the coalition group. forces in Iraq, however, upon returning to the country and facing financial problems, the majority of Georgian military personnel chose to leave the army.
The cost of another American program, Operation Stability, implemented since 2005, is $60 million. In addition, US gratuitous assistance is provided under the Foreign Arms Financing (FMF) and International Education and Training (IMET) programs. Under the FMF and IMET programs in 2005, the United States allocated $11.9 and $1.4 million to Georgia, respectively (in 2006 and 2007, funding volumes will remain at the 2005 level). According to some estimates, over the past 12 years, the Americans have provided assistance to Georgia, including in the military sphere, in the amount of $1.3 billion.
The Republic of Turkey is considered the second most important military partner of Georgia. According to data published in Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS, Turkey has provided about $40 million in free military assistance since 1998. With Turkish help, the modernization of the Marneuli airfield of the Georgian Air Force was completed in 2004. Today it is able to service combat aviation flights not only during the day, but also at night in any meteorological conditions. In the near future, with the participation of Turkish specialists in Senaki, in close proximity to the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the construction of the country's first military base that meets NATO standards will be fully completed. About 3 thousand military personnel will be stationed there, the main goal of which, according to the Georgian Minister of Defense, is to ensure the country's security in the area adjacent to Abkhazia.
At the same time, recently the Turkish side, drawing lessons from the first years of interaction, is moving away from the practice of direct foreign currency financing of Georgian defense projects due to the systematic embezzlement of funds and is switching to specific material and technical supplies. In particular, cars, radio stations, computers and ammunition are being transferred to the Georgian side. Nevertheless, thefts in the Georgian Armed Forces continue to occur. Thus, according to the REGNUM news agency, in 2004, significant shortages of weapons were discovered in warehouses, including man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. The charge of theft was then brought against the head of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, Colonel A. Diasalidze. This revelation was preceded by the publication in the media of numerous articles about facts of corruption and the loss of weapons and ammunition in the Georgian Armed Forces, in particular about the discovery in August 2004 of stones instead of grenades in boxes with ammunition sent to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone for units of the republic's security forces. It was also reported that the Georgian army is illegally decommissioning weapons and ammunition, which are subsequently sold abroad as scrap metal.
The assistance provided to Georgia in defense construction by Western partners is comprehensive and diverse, which indicates the seriousness and long-term nature of NATO’s intentions in the South Caucasus. In addition to financial and military-technical assistance within the framework of military cooperation, Western partners provide this country with assistance in training specialists and share experience in operational equipment of the territory, borders and military bases. Turkish and American advisers work in Georgian law enforcement agencies. NATO representatives take an active part in the development of Georgian legislation, primarily those issues related to security, the use of dual-use technologies, the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crime and corruption, drug trafficking, money laundering, etc. Since 1996, Georgia has been participating in almost all NATO exercises conducted in the Black Sea region within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program.
With the help of the European Marshall Center for Security Studies (Germany) within the framework of individual plan Georgia's partnership with NATO, in force since 2004, has developed a national defense strategy. Center experts also take part in the assessment
existing threats to the country's security and, on this basis, develop recommendations on the structure and organization of the Georgian Armed Forces, their numbers and weapons.
The Georgian armed forces include ground forces, air Force, Naval Defense Forces and National Guard. The Georgian army is armed with mainly Soviet-made models with completely or substantially exhausted service life. This is especially true for aviation equipment and air defense systems.
Ground forces formations are deployed in the largest cities (Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, Senaki, Akhaltsikhe, Gombori, Sachkhere). The number of regular ground forces contingent is gradually decreasing. So, if in 2004 (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS) it was 20 thousand people, then for 2006 it is planned at the level of 12.6 thousand. Moreover, according to experts, currently those who are considered to be well prepared no more than 2 thousand military personnel. By 2009, it is planned to train another 3 thousand people. The most acute problem is the lack of weapons, in particular, armored fighting vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, mine detectors. However, simultaneously with the reduction in the regular contingent of the ground component of the armed forces, the number is growing. trained reservists. According to some estimates, today there are 6.5 thousand people.
The situation is worse in the Air Force and Air Defense formations. This is explained by the fact that Georgia has not seriously trained specialists for this type of aircraft. Shortage of aircraft and spare parts, availability large quantities faulty equipment and a lack of qualified maintenance personnel and flight crews negatively affect the combat effectiveness of this type of aircraft. In accordance with Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment..., the main aviation forces are based at the airfields of Kopitnari, Novo-Alekseevka (near Tbilisi) and Marneuli.
Close attention is paid to the naval defense forces (SDF) of Georgia, which is explained by the general focus of military development on strengthening the borders of the republic, both land and sea. At the same time, despite the fact that the ships' resources will be exhausted in 2008-2009, Tbilisi is counting on extending the service life of most of the surface forces after an appropriate assessment of their condition and modernization. Currently, according to the Jane's Fighting Ships directory, the Georgian Defense Forces have eight patrol boats (one Turkish-built "Turk" type, two Greek-built "Dilos" type, one "Kombatan-2" type, built in France and transferred by Greece, four received from Ukraine - projects 205P, 206MP, 360), two small landing ships of project 106K (built in Bulgaria) and two tank-landing boats of project 1176 (Soviet-built). The main bases of the SMO are Batumi and Poti.
Currently, the Georgian Armed Forces operate a mixed recruitment method. A gradual transition to a fully contract army is planned. The timing of the transition has not yet been determined. Conscription age is 18-27 years old. Mandatory period military service 12 months. When appointing to higher positions, preference, as a rule, is given to military personnel who have received military education in the West. At the same time, various obstacles are being created for career advancement for those who studied at Soviet and Russian military universities.
As noted above, a significant part of the military budget is spent on weapons purchases. Its main suppliers are Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Eastern European states - Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, as well as Greece, Turkey and others. The arms supply process is equally beneficial for both suppliers and Georgia. The former are getting rid of obsolete Soviet weapons, while Tbilisi is acquiring them with funds generously allocated for these purposes by the United States. Recently, Israel has joined the work on modernizing Georgian combat aircraft.
Thus, at present, the Georgian armed forces are small in number, poorly armed and poorly trained to conduct large-scale combat operations. An analysis of the direction and parameters of defense construction allows us to judge that some formations, with appropriate advance preparation, can conduct local combat operations at the tactical level.
The Georgian leadership expects that in the future the Armed Forces, with the support of Western partners, will become more powerful due to possible modernization and replacement of the main weapons, more mobile due to the development of operational training plans and will acquire a more harmonious structure, and believes that the main defensive functions will fall on the coalition forces in the event integration of the republic into NATO. However, the timing of Georgia’s entry into the alliance is not yet clear, including taking into account the negative trends taking place in the defense sector.
P. S.
* Georgia acquired a batch of Su-25 attack aircraft withdrawn from the Macedonian Air Force. According to local media, CEO The Tbilaviastroy company confirmed the receipt by the Georgian side of four combat vehicles through the mediation of the Bulgarian company EMKO. These aircraft are expected to be upgraded to the Su-25KM Scorpion modification. The cost of modernizing one machine is 3-3.5 million dollars. Re-equipping the four aircraft transferred to Georgia will cost approximately $14 million.
In 2001, Macedonia received four Su-25 attack aircraft from Ukraine. In 2004, under pressure from the United States, it was announced that they would be withdrawn from the Balkan country’s air force. Currently, the Georgian Air Force has seven such aircraft, two of which are Su-25KM.
In April 2004, the President of Georgia announced that it was planned to sell ten Su-25s (probably Su-25KM) in the near future, without specifically indicating the countries with which contracts were planned to be concluded.
The aircraft plant in Tbilisi began producing its first products in 1941 after several aircraft factories from southern Russia were evacuated to this former Soviet republic. Since the 1970s, they began assembling Su-25 attack aircraft here. With the collapse of the USSR, the production of military aircraft in Georgia fell into decline. In the years Soviet power the number of employees there reached 14 thousand people, and in the 90s it decreased to 4 thousand. Currently, the export capabilities of the Tbilisi enterprise have increased thanks to the participation of the Israeli company Elbit Systems, which in 2001 developed a project to equip the aircraft with new on-board electronics . Now the Su-25KM Scorpion is capable of performing combat missions in difficult weather conditions and at night.
* In 2001-2005, the Georgian Ministry of Defense acquired and entered into contracts for the purchase of 24 tanks, 97 armored vehicles of various types, 95 artillery systems, about 100 thousand units of various automatic small arms (including 5.56-mm TAR 21 automatic rifles produced by the Israeli company IMI), four combat training aircraft, four Su-25 attack aircraft, four MiG-23 fighters, five helicopters and over 60 million different ammunition. The main suppliers of these weapons and military equipment to Georgia are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Hungary and Romania.
* The Georgian Ministry of Defense has completed the first stage of the program for the disposal of Soviet-made weapons located on the territory of former Russian military facilities in this country. According to the national Ministry of Defense, in March 2006, the last Krug air defense missile was neutralized at the base in Ponichala (a suburb of Tbilisi), and its warhead was exploded at the training ground of the military base in Vaziani. This program has been implemented with financial support from the NATO Logistics and Support Agency (NAMSA) for three years. The cost of implementing the first part was 1.2 million euros. By the beginning of March 2006, a total of 569 anti-aircraft guided missiles for the S-75 and S-200 complexes, as well as for the Krug air defense system, had been disposed of. The work to destroy them is being carried out by specialists from the Georgian military scientific and technical center “Delta”. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, a certain amount of Soviet-made weapons still remains at various military facilities in the country, and negotiations are currently underway with NATO representatives regarding the possibility of continuing the program for their elimination.
(Based on materials from the ARMS-TASS Information Agency)
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The Georgian military-political leadership considers the armed forces of Georgia as an important instrument for ensuring the security of the state and reserves the right to use them for joint defense within the framework of agreements and treaties concluded with other states and unions. In addition, they can be used to assist law enforcement agencies in resolving acute internal crises, eliminating the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, and solving problems in the fight against terrorists and criminal elements. Georgia's doctrinal documents still do not rule out the involvement of the armed forces in the forceful resolution of contradictions with neighboring states, including in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The new concept of the country's national security, approved by the Georgian parliament in December 2011, reinforced the Euro-Atlantic focus of the country's current leadership and the course towards building armed forces along Western lines. According to this document Russia is the main military threat to the republic.
In accordance with the Defense Law, the Georgian Armed Forces are entrusted with the following tasks:
ensuring the implementation of political decisions made by the executive and legislative authorities Georgia in the field of defense;
identification of threats taking into account the existing military-political situation;
maintaining military units in a state of high combat readiness;
development of proposals for improvement organizational structure Sun;
carrying out tasks for military cooperation with, in accordance with international treaties and agreements.
According to the constitution supreme commander in chief of the armed forces of Georgia is the president of the country.
The development of the military doctrine of the state, the determination of the main directions of building the armed forces and their comprehensive support are within the competence of the Minister of Defense of the Republic ( civilian). Since August 2009, this post has been occupied by B. Akhalaya.
Operational leadership of the Georgian armed forces is entrusted to the Chief of the Joint Staff (CS). Since March 2009, this post has been held by Major General D. Chankotadze.
After the defeat during the August 2008 events, the Georgian leadership reformed the national armed forces. In particular, in 2009, the naval defense forces as a branch of the armed forces ceased to exist. The ship's personnel, coastal infrastructure, as well as personnel were transferred to the coast guard of the Border Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. In 2010, the Georgian Air Force was disbanded, and air defense forces and ground forces aviation were created on its basis.
The reforms being carried out in the Georgian armed forces are financed from the state budget, as well as through assistance provided by NATO member countries. In 2012, official Tbilisi plans to spend $406 million on military purposes (the 2011 defense budget was $427 million). The main foreign donor in providing military assistance to Georgia is the United States. In 2012, within the framework of the American programs “Education and Training of Foreign Specialists (IMET)” and “Providing Financial Assistance for Military Needs” foreign countries(FMF)” the Georgian side is expected to allocate $2 million and $16 million, respectively. Help also comes from Turkey in the form of supplies Vehicle, communication equipment, computer technology, as well as various military equipment. Previously practiced direct transfer financial resources Ankara considered it inappropriate to implement Georgian military programs due to the high level of corruption in Georgia.
STRUCTURE AND COMBAT COMPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF GEORGIA
The Georgian Armed Forces currently organizationally consist of ground forces, special operations forces (SSO), the national guard, as well as units and institutions of central subordination. During periods of threat and wartime, units of the Border Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (more than 5 thousand people) are transferred to the operational subordination of the command of the armed forces. The total number of Georgian armed forces is 37.8 thousand people. The mobilization resource of the state is about 300 thousand.
The ground forces are the only type of Georgian armed forces that are designed to conduct combat operations independently and in cooperation with the national guard and special forces. Their number is about 23.5 thousand people.
The combat composition of the ground forces includes: ten brigades (five infantry, two artillery, engineering, aviation and air defense); five separate battalions- two light infantry (olpb), communications (obs), electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare (about electronic warfare and electronic warfare), medical (omedb); helicopter base.
The main tactical unit of the Georgian ground forces is the brigade. The infantry brigade structurally includes three infantry and mixed tank battalions, an artillery battalion, a support battalion and five companies (headquarters, medical, reconnaissance, communications, engineering). The total strength of the infantry brigade is 3200-3500 people.
The Georgian ground forces are armed with about 170 tanks (T-55, T-72), 210 field artillery guns, mortars and MLRS of 100 mm caliber and more, 310 armored combat vehicles (BMP-1/2, BTR-70/80, "Edger") Military equipment is mainly of Soviet design. A significant amount of it was modernized by Israeli and Ukrainian companies. In 2009, the Turkish company Nurol Makina supplied 70 Edgeder armored personnel carriers. Georgia became the first and only country possessing these machines. The command of the Turkish Armed Forces never accepted them into service as they did not meet the requirements.
The Georgian leadership is showing increased interest in developing its own military-industrial complex. In particular, pilot production of wheeled armored combat vehicles (AFVs) “Didgori-1 and -2” has been established at Tbilaviamsheni OJSC. These samples of military equipment are assembled from components supplied from abroad and have limited combat and operational capabilities. The organization of mass production of these armored fighting vehicles will make it possible in the future to replace trucks, currently used to transport infantry units.
The demonstration of the first Didgori samples was timed to coincide with the military parade on the occasion of the celebration of Georgian Independence Day (May 26, 2011). It is noteworthy that the assembly of the machines was completed immediately before the festive event, with the involvement of technical specialists from car repair enterprises close to OJSC “Tbilaviamsheni”. It is planned to put the Didgori into service after the completion of the test program and the elimination of numerous design and technical deficiencies.
Since January 2008, the Georgian leadership has been gradually transferring its armed forces to NATO-accepted 5.56 mm automatic small arms. AKM and AK-74 assault rifles are transferred to reserve formations and warehouses. American M4AZ assault rifles are also being supplied to the troops.
Georgian military aviation is included in the structure of the ground forces. It includes an aviation brigade (Marneuli) and a helicopter base (Novoalekseevka, a suburb of Tbilisi). The basis of combat aviation is the Su-25 attack aircraft (14 units, including five Su-25K Mimino, equipped with modern avionics at Tbilaviamsheni OJSC with the participation of Israeli specialists). The Georgian Armed Forces also have eight L-39 Albatross combat training aircraft, 40 helicopters (Mi-24, Mi-8, Mi-14 and UH-1H Iroquois), military transport aircraft (one An-28, six An-2) and Israeli-made Hermes-450 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. Aviation technology is based at three airfields: Marneuli (Su-25, L-39, An-2), Novoalekseevka (Mi-8/14/24, UH-1H Iroquois) and Kopitnari (Mi-8/24).
The ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance using modern unmanned aerial vehicles is highlighted by Western military experts as one of the few positive features of the Georgian army. At the same time, property and financial disputes between Tbilisi and Tel Aviv related to Georgians’ partial non-payment for deliveries of the Hermes-450 UAV have significantly limited further interaction between the parties in the field of military-technical cooperation.
The tasks of covering troops from enemy air are carried out by the air defense brigade (it is armed with the Buk-M1, Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as the Israeli-made Spider) and air defense units of combined arms formations (equipped with MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery) .
Georgia has a developed network of dual-use radar stations, allowing full control of the situation in airspace countries only at high altitudes. Since October 2007, the republic has been included in the NATO air situation data exchange system (ASDE - Air Situation Data Exchange System), as a result of which the Georgian side has gained access to data coming from radar systems of other member states and alliance partners.
The lack of specialized military educational institutions and training grounds does not allow Georgia to independently train technical specialists for the operation of anti-aircraft and radio-technical systems, which negatively affects the combat readiness of air defense forces. Foreign assistance provided in this area does not solve all existing problems.
The Georgian special operations forces, intended to conduct reconnaissance, special and counter-terrorism operations, report directly to the head of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces. Their basis is a special operations group (brigade level formation), which includes headquarters, special forces battalions and support units. It is armed with small arms, lightly armored vehicles, and off-road vehicles.
The National Guard (NG) is the basis of the reserve of the Georgian armed forces. NG has the status of a department and is subordinate to the chief of the joint staff. The number of personnel is about 500 people.
The National Guard includes: a headquarters, two reserve infantry brigades, a training center, a support unit, an honor guard and a band. The number of trained NG reserves is more than 35 thousand people. In accordance with the plans of the Georgian leadership, by 2012 the number of trained reservists in the country is planned to be increased to 100 thousand, and by 2015 - to 200 thousand people.
The training system for National Guard reservists that existed until August 2008 was considered ineffective after the defeat of Georgia. In 2009, the country adopted a new “Concept for the recruitment and training of the military reserve”, according to which in 2010 the law “On Military Reserve Service” was revised. In its new edition, the NG is entrusted with three main functions: ensuring the security of the state when repelling an attack by an external enemy in accordance with the plans for the combat use of the Georgian Armed Forces' General Staff; liquidation of consequences emergency situations, natural Disasters and man-made disasters; guarding important strategic facilities, suppressing riots and carrying out civil defense activities.
The new organization of the reserve service provides for its division into compulsory and voluntary. The compulsory reserve is staffed by citizens under the age of 40, fit for military service, as well as former military personnel of any military rank and gender. Persons at least 27 years of age, including those who have already completed military training, can join the voluntary reserve.
After enlisting in the reserve service, reservists are given a four-year contract, which provides for 45 days of training and additional training for five days once a year. Training of reservists of the National Guard of the Armed Forces of Georgia is carried out in accordance with the training system adopted in the National Guard of the US Armed Forces. At the same time, special attention is paid to preparing for participation in counter-terrorism operations, in particular, issues of blocking settlements and combat in urban environments, as well as the transition to guerrilla warfare.
The management of centrally subordinate bodies and units is carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces.
Units and institutions of central subordination include: the command of combat training and military education, the military police department (military police battalion) and the logistics command.
COMBAT TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF GEORGIA
The Combat Training and Military Education Command is responsible for improving the military personnel training system, control and coordination in the field of military education. Military training is carried out according to NATO standards
The command structure includes the following military personnel educational establishments:
National Defense Academy named after. David Agmashenebeli (Gori) – training of junior officers, as well as retraining of command personnel at various levels;
sergeant training school (Gori) – professional training and retraining of sergeants;
national training center “Krtsanisi” (Krtsanisi) – basic military and specialized training of military personnel;
armored training center (Akhaltsikhe) – training of crews of mechanized and armored units;
mountain training center (Sachkhere) – mountain military training of military personnel, including from NATO member countries and Georgia’s partners.
The training of officers at the academy is carried out according to the bachelor's (four years) and master's (two years) training programs introduced in 2011. Citizens under the age of 24 with secondary education are accepted into bachelor's programs. Those entering the academy, taking into account the test results, can choose one of the specialties of commanders of infantry, tank, artillery, engineering, as well as aviation and anti-aircraft units.
Some disciplines and courses are taught in foreign languages by American, British, German and Turkish military specialists. Methodological developments And teaching aids provided by the US Army Command.
Training of junior command personnel of the Georgian armed forces is carried out on the basis of the sergeant training school in Gori according to a 12-week program. Since 2006, only specially selected military personnel have been trained in this institution contract service who have signed a new contract for a period of at least five years. Military specialists from the United States and Germany provide assistance in organizing this process.
Thus, almost the entire scientific, pedagogical and instructor staff of the Georgian army has been assembled in Gori, which makes it possible to widely attract highly qualified personnel to train military personnel of various categories.
In the cities of Tbilisi and Kutaisi there are research centers established with the help of the North Atlantic Alliance. in English, in which, under the leadership of military personnel from the UK, Georgian officers are trained, selected for subsequent deployment in order to improve their knowledge in military educational institutions of NATO member states, for military training in the armed forces of the bloc countries, as well as for participation in alliance exercises
The recruitment of the armed forces of Georgia is carried out in accordance with the laws “On military duty and military service" (2005) and "On the status of military personnel" (2004). Service by conscription, contract and reserve is provided. All male citizens of the republic between the ages of 18 and 27 are subject to compulsory conscription. The period of compulsory military service is 12 months (six months for university graduates). Citizens of the country have the right to choose alternative service duration 24 months (for university graduates 18 months),
A citizen who did not appear at a meeting of the commission in deadlines, is subject to a fine of 100 to 200 lari (60 to 120 dollars). If he regularly fails to appear at the draft commission, by decision of its chairman, documents confirming draft evasion are transferred to the prosecutor's office. According to Georgian legislation, a “draft dodger” faces a penalty of imprisonment for up to three years. At the same time, there is an official system of paying off military service. Those wishing to receive a one-year deferment from conscription into the armed forces must pay 2,000 lari ($1,200) in state duty.
Persons under the age of 35 who have completed military service in the Georgian armed forces or have been trained as NG reservists can be accepted into military service under a contract on a competitive basis. In this case, the primary contract is concluded for a period of three years.
The total number of conscripts in 2011 increased by more than 1.6 times compared to 2010 and amounted to about 8 thousand people. The increase in the share of conscripts in the structure of the Georgian armed forces was a direct consequence of the outflow of trained soldiers and sergeants from the army, who refused to renew contracts for military service with the Ministry of Defense,
In turn, the Georgian defense department is pursuing a targeted policy aimed at increasing the prestige of military service. To this end, work is being intensified to widely involve journalists in covering military exercises, high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defense are making public appearances to increase the authority of the army, benefits provided to military personnel are being comprehensively promoted and social guarantees. Soldiers and officers take an active part in national and municipal ceremonial events.
At the same time, in Georgian society and the armed forces there remains a fairly strong opinion about corruption and insufficient professional training of command personnel, as well as about the presence serious problems in the army environment. A clear confirmation of this was the anti-government protests in a separate tank battalion in Mukhrovani in May 2009, which were harshly suppressed.
PRESENCE OF GEORGIAN ARMED FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN
According to the leadership of the Georgian armed forces, one of the most important elements of training troops is their participation in peacekeeping operations. In this regard, from September 2009 in training center"Krtsanisi" is training Georgian military personnel to participate in operations International forces Security Assistance (ISAF) in Afghanistan. With the assistance of American instructors, four infantry battalions, formed mainly from soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, numbering about 750 people each, underwent similar training.
The contingent of the Georgian armed forces in Afghanistan is currently represented by one reinforced battalion (about 750 people) and a mixed company (up to 175), taking part in ISAF activities as part of the American (Helmand province) and French (suburbs of Kabul) military contingents on a rotational basis. In addition, one group of Georgian artillery instructors, together with the French, is training Afghan military personnel in Nangarhar province. In 2012, Tbilisi plans to increase the size of its national military contingent to 1,680 people by sending another infantry battalion to Afghanistan.
The Georgian command is unable to reverse the situation with ongoing manifestations of hazing among military personnel, as well as negligent attitude to the implementation of job responsibilities. This has a negative impact on daily activities, and also leads to an unreasonably high level of personnel losses and theft of material resources. In this context, the most indicative is the situation developing in the military collectives of the contingent of the Georgian armed forces in Afghanistan, where, despite the professional selection of military personnel and their training by Western military instructors, a difficult moral and psychological climate is developing.
Contrary to statements by the Georgian leadership and ISAF command about the high professional qualities of Georgian military personnel, private reviews from their foreign colleagues contain a number of negative assessments. Often, the attitude of Georgians towards their presence in a foreign country is expressed only in the desire to earn money without compromising their health. The level of training and military discipline in Georgian units is openly criticized even by the Americans, under whose command they are in Afghanistan. The Western media noted facts of the involvement of Georgian military personnel in theft and looting in the crisis zone. The decline in motivation to serve in ISAF is facilitated by the increasing losses of Georgian military personnel (since 2009, 12 have been killed and up to 100 people have been injured), as well as the authorities’ failure to fulfill their obligations for the social and medical rehabilitation of the victims.
CONCLUSION
Foreign military experts claim that since 2009 the level vocational training The number of personnel of the Georgian Armed Forces has increased slightly as a result of intensified combat training. At the same time, commanders do not fully master the skills of leading subordinate units; control at the platoon-company level and above is carried out by them with uncertainty.
In general, as foreign experts note, the Georgian armed forces still have to go through long haul in order to begin to approach the standards of modern armed forces.
(A. Vetrov, “Foreign Military Review”) modernarmy.ru
Writes citadel: On November 4, I had the opportunity to spend several hours in the 4th Infantry Brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces. From what I found online about this unit, it was formed from former Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was the first to enter Tskhinvali, had the greatest losses, the military unit itself was bombed in August 2008.
(Total 51 photos)
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1. Today the barracks look like this.
2. On the parade ground we were shown the brigade’s arsenal. In order. T-72Sim1 is an Israeli modernization of a Russian tank, sold (if I understand correctly) to Georgia by Ukraine (we have this stuff, which is not in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in bulk). The main improvements include the installation of a thermal imager and GPS, dynamic protection. These are small things, but in this way the tanks get the ability to operate at night, which the unmodernized tanks of neighboring countries cannot. Even before these tanks, we sold 200 Kombat ATGMs, but the brigade doesn’t know about them, and therefore doesn’t use them. The brigade includes 1 tank battalion.
3. To deliver infantry to the battlefield, the brigade uses two armored personnel carriers: the Soviet BTR-80 and the Turkish EJDER (supplied to the brigade since 2009).
4. According to my estimates, there are less than 9 such vehicles in the brigade.
6. The armored personnel carrier is equipped with an M40 automatic grenade launcher; fire is carried out remotely.
7. The seats in the infantry compartment are not fixed, which makes it possible to absorb the impact force from an explosion under the bottom.
8. Turkish Kobra armored car with the same M40.
9. Humvee with PCM.
10. The ZSU-24-2 based on the MT-LB, which serves as the brigade’s air defense, was not captured. They also carry MANPADS on ATVs. Well, the trucks are, of course, our KrAZs.
11. Here’s what else Georgian infantrymen use as fire support: AGS-17, SPG-9 and Utes.
12. M40 is also used in a portable version.
13. Portable ATGM system "Fagot", modernized - a thermal imager is installed.
15. Galil sniper rifle (Israel).
16. Unidentified pistols.
17. Negev light machine guns (Israel)
18. A typical infantryman of the fourth brigade. Camouflage - multicam or marpat. Behind there is a camelback with water. Equipment includes modern first aid kits, disposable chemical flashlights, dry rations, radio station, knife, etc.
19. The brigade moved (by at least declaratively) for M4 assault rifles assembled by Bushmaster.
20. True, in the weapons room and all the sentries have AK-74s. That is, the M4 is treated like a dress uniform.
21. A simulator is used to “shoot” the M4.
23. Charging real store with a gas canister. Therefore, there is minimal recoil, the shutter moves, there are enough “shots” for about 35 times, i.e. a simulation, more or less. Aim for a small circle. The results of each shooter are displayed on the instructor’s screen.
25. The same for LNG-9.
26. T-72 - yes-boom!
27. and for RPG-7
28. There is also a simulator designed for a squad, there is a machine gun and grenade launchers. Various real combat situations are simulated.
33. Illumination and sound are impressive. If you don’t manage to complete the task on time, the “enemy” manages to call for artillery support or an airstrike, and then this is what appears on the screen.
34. The simulator is interesting because the commander actually practices controlling his unit. The sound of gunfire is so strong that radio stations are also used. But this is where everything is controlled.
36. And now a little about everyday life. These are the barracks where they sleep. By the way, the army is completely contract-based. Some of the fighters go home for the night, a detachment remains rapid response and those who decided to stay.
37. The canteen operates on the principle of outsourcing. There are no food standards. The condition must simply be implemented so that the soldiers are well-fed and healthy.
38. Distribution.
Georgian soldiers are learning to fight not only in Transcaucasia...
Photo by Reuters
No. 23 of NVO published an article by Alexander Khramchikhin, which contained very unflattering assessments of the state and capabilities of the Georgian armed forces, the ability of this country and its army to put an end to the independent existence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The editors of the weekly considered it possible to present to the readers a different opinion on the issues raised.
LEARNED LESSONS
The Georgian armed forces have a bad reputation, especially in Russia, since our military had to deal directly with them on the battlefield. In the first half of 1992, the Georgians unsuccessfully stormed the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali (the conflict ended, through the mediation of Moscow, in a virtual draw - the division of South Ossetia into Georgian and Ossetian control zones).
In August 1992, the troops of the State Council ruling in Tbilisi invaded Abkhazia. However, calling them “troops” is a lot of honor. These were, rather, gangs in the worst sense of the word: militants from the Mkhedrioni organization of the famous thief in law Jaba Ioseliani and the “national guard” of Tengiz Kitovani. Unless they had a lot of weapons and armored vehicles, attack helicopters received during the division with Russian side Soviet military property on Georgian territory.
Not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but throughout Georgia, the Mkhedrioni militants and other armed rabble of the early nineties are remembered with hatred. Ioseliani later died in Tbilisi under troubled circumstances, but Kitovani is alive and well, owning a restaurant in Moscow, where Russian authorities granted him asylum.
The war in Abkhazia continued for more than a year and ended in 1993 with the complete defeat and expulsion of Georgians, including up to 250 thousand civilians. It is precisely since then that a persistently negative assessment of the combat capabilities of the Georgian state and nation has been preserved. Although, for the sake of fairness, it must be taken into account that Russia and volunteers from the North Caucasus, including Chechen militants Shamil Basayev, actively helped the Abkhazians to defeat them, and Russian pilots secretly bombed Georgian positions. In addition, when in September 1993 the Abkhaz formations began a decisive assault on Sukhumi, an uprising of supporters of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia began in the rear of the Georgian group in Western Georgia.
Since then, for a long time, the Georgian state and its armed forces remained in the most pitiful state. After 2001, as part of the world war on terrorism, the United States began to equip and train several Georgian battalions at its own expense to conduct anti-guerrilla, anti-terrorist operations and donated 10 old Iroquois UH-1H transport helicopters free of charge. But overall, President Mikheil Saakashvili and his supporters, who overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze at the end of 2003 as a result of the Rose Revolution, were left with a poorly trained and armed army and a poorly equipped air force and navy.
In the summer of 2004, the Georgians tried to besiege Tskhinvali, violating the truce in South Ossetia that had been stable since 1992, based on joint transit smuggling trade through the Roki tunnel to Russia. But in 2004, the Georgians near Tskhinvali achieved nothing, they only suffered significant losses. Saakashvili, correctly assessing the failure, decisively began military reform.
SHARP CHANGES
Russia has developed a completely wrong idea about the new Georgian ruling elite. Saakashvili is a strong, intelligent, purposeful and very energetic national leader. He, however, is very impatient, trying to remake Georgia and Georgians in a short time, being firmly convinced, like Peter the Great in his time in Russia, that he knows better than anyone what his country and people need. Saakashvili's team consists mostly of young, Western-trained, energetic and efficient people. They were able to remake Georgia in four years, as no one could have expected.
In Georgia, they didn’t seem to fight corruption, while at the same time talking about the inevitability of this evil - to everyone’s surprise, it was practically eliminated. While we in Russia were slowly talking about the need for military reform, about the modernization of the Armed Forces, about the “innovative army”, in Georgia they created a new model of armed forces from scratch. Only desperate ignorance could explain Russian attempts to bring Georgia to its knees by banning the import of wine and Borjomi, cutting off electricity and gas, banning money transfers and direct flights, introducing visa regime. It soon became clear that the effect of the sanctions was close to zero, that “Georgian wine” for the Russian Federation was produced in the North Caucasus, that Moscow cannot control international system bank transfers, that Tbilisi easily found a replacement for our gas and electricity, that last year, in particular, Georgian GDP grew by 16%. At the same time, a clear underestimation of the current Georgian army may turn out to be even more dangerous in the event of a completely possible military conflict.
Rapid economic growth and massive privatization of state property through tenders open to foreigners have replenished the Georgian budget. Over four years, military spending increased more than 30 times, reaching 9–10% of GDP. IN Last year Shevardnadze's reign - in 2003 - Georgia's military budget was 30 million dollars. In 2004 - 90 million. In 2005 - approximately 200 million. In 2006 - about half a billion. In 2007, the military budget was revised upward twice, and by the end of the year, $1 billion had been spent. For 2008, the Georgian parliament approved military spending of $800 million, but, according to Defense Minister David Kezerashvili, “this Bye". Over the course of the year, military spending will undoubtedly increase and, depending on how the situation develops, could range from $1.5 to $2 billion.
A lot of money for Georgia was spent quite wisely. Georgia stopped conscription and formed a combat-ready regular volunteer army of more than 30 thousand military personnel. In addition, the concept of people's “total defense” has been approved, but a corps of reservists with an estimated strength of 100 thousand people is being formed in the American way, creating a voluntary national guard. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, as of May of this year, up to 40 thousand reservists from among non-serving volunteer citizens have been trained, and there is still an active reserve of up to 25 thousand people who have served in the Armed Forces. Currently, the first 4 national guard brigades are being formed in Georgia on the basis of already formed territorial battalions. IN Peaceful time brigades will be staffed (47 officers and sergeants of regular service in each), if there is a threat, they will be deployed in full force. The mobilization of Georgian volunteer reservists is fully provided with stocks of Soviet-style weapons, ammunition and equipment.
Since mid-May, mass training of reservists for retraining has been going on in Georgia. Georgia approached the start of a possible full-scale armed conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the near future in high mobilization readiness. National Guard units can be used to perform auxiliary defensive and security tasks. In the event of a protracted conflict, trained reservists can serve as a source of reinforcement for regular units.
AT THE LEVEL OF MODERN REQUIREMENTS
The Georgian army consists of 6 regular brigades. 4 Georgian infantry brigades are completely independent formations of 3,300 people each and consist of 3 infantry battalions of 591 people each, 1 armored (mechanized) battalion, an artillery battalion, a communications company, a logistics company, and an engineering unit. Currently, the number of tanks in the infantry brigades is being doubled: the armored battalion is being transformed into 2 tank companies and 1 motorized infantry company. A significant part of the Georgian infantry personnel was tested in Iraq, where more than 2 thousand Georgian military personnel are deployed today.
Georgian infantry brigades are trained primarily for combat operations in mountainous and wooded areas and in staffing table armed with mortars. All long-barreled artillery, self-propelled and towed, as well as multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) are combined into a single artillery brigade. The relatively small size of the potential theater of military operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as a fairly dense network of roads, will obviously allow the Georgian command to effectively maneuver heavy artillery and MLRS combined into a single fist, creating fire superiority at the right time and in the right place.
Units of the Georgian army special forces have been consolidated into a brigade special purpose. All helicopters were transferred from army brigades and special forces to the Air Force, which now has 6 squadrons. Two transport ones: Mi-8 and UH-1H. Two attack aircraft: Su-25 and mixed Mi-8/Mi-17, Mi-24. One training one - L-39. One is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is planned in the future to concentrate all existing UAVs as part of a single army reconnaissance battalion. Anti-aircraft missile systems are assembled as part of the Air Force, and army units are equipped with MANPADS. A modern unified operational command center for air warfare has been created, equipped and functioning. The territory of Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is covered by a single radar field.
The Navy has two missile boats: the Soviet Project 206MR with P-20 missiles and the French with Exocet missiles. There are patrol and landing boats. The Georgian Ministry of Defense believes that the current Navy is poorly prepared to conduct a naval war and can only display the flag. However, the Abkhaz home-made fleet is even weaker. The personnel of the regular ground units is more than 17 thousand, the Air Force - 2000, the Navy - 700, the central and administrative apparatus, the logistics service and other support services - more than 9000 people. General base transformed according to Western standards into the Joint Headquarters.
The internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were transferred to the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has 15 thousand police officers, and there are also several special battalions deployed in the confrontation zone in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where ceasefire agreements strictly limit or completely prohibit the presence of army units. There is a battalion of police special forces in Tbilisi, equipped and trained to resist riots(type of riot police). It was this battalion that on November 7, 2007, very effectively dispersed the crowds of opposition in Tbilisi - not a single one was killed or seriously wounded.
In the event of a full-scale armed conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia this year, the Georgians will be able to put up to 80 thousand people under arms. In the event of a protracted conflict - up to 100 thousand. In 2009, the implementation of the planned military construction measures will significantly increase the defense capabilities of the Georgian state in qualitative and quantitative terms, so today Tbilisi has no objective interest in initiating a war right now.
In general, the current organization of Georgia's military forces looks reasonably balanced, it corresponds to the state's capabilities and pressing tasks. In parallel with building defense structures, Saakashvili’s government began to qualitatively re-equip the Armed Forces. In 2007, supplies of the most modern equipment and weapons began, which neither the Ossetian, nor the Abkhaz, nor the Russian troops have.
The Georgians purchased several dozen Israeli UAVs of various sizes and purposes. These drones are capable of collecting and transmitting real-time intelligence about the enemy at any time of the day or night, including GPS coordinates of targets. Also purchased from Israel: a computer combat control and target designation system interfaced with a UAV, 155-mm self-propelled howitzers capable of using data from unmanned vehicles for high-precision shooting with GPS targeting at a range of up to 40 km. Today, up to 200 Israeli military contractors are preparing the Georgians to fight modern network-centric warfare with the massive use of cheap, GPS-based precision weapons.
Soviet-style artillery and Grad MLRS, of which the Georgian army has many, cannot be directly integrated into the computerized network of modern high-precision fire weapons. But, according to Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia, partial integration is being considered: a significant increase in shooting accuracy using UAV data for real-time adjustments.
Georgian leaders claim that, with the help of the Israelis, they have modernized 7 Su-25 attack aircraft for use at night and in bad weather. Using data from UAVs with infrared cameras, the Georgian military can apparently fight at night today, using the direct support of strike aircraft and heavy artillery, when their potential opponents - assorted separatist formations, North Caucasian volunteers, and Russian troops - are blind and practically defenseless.
FORCES ARE NOT EQUAL
The training and morale of the Georgian army personnel generally corresponds to new organization Armed Forces and purchased modern weapons. Today in Georgia the prestige of the military and police services is high. Soldiers and officers receive decent money by Georgian standards - from 500 to 1000 dollars a month. Military bases corresponding to Western standards were built in Senaki, Khoni, Gori, Kutaisi, for the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Georgian sector of South Ossetia. Saakashvili often visits the bases of his army, spends the night there and eats soldiers' food. To further unite the personnel, soldiers and commanders eat the same food together in the same canteens in the American style. The food is good. IN Russian army and this is unthinkable for the fleet.
Georgia has a national military academy for junior officers and a school for training professional sergeants, created with German assistance. Senior officers are trained in Western military academies. With French help, a school of mountain warfare was created. Georgian mountain instructors were trained in the French and Swiss mountain troops and are sent to France twice a year for retraining. Perhaps, Saakashvili managed to create in a short time at least a small, but the highest quality army in the post-Soviet space.
In modern Georgia, no one, even the most friendly people towards Russia, is ready to give up Abkhazia and South Ossetia without a fight. In the event of an armed conflict, Georgian soldiers and volunteer reservists will fight for the liberation of their native land and the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, feeling the support of the entire people.
The situation is different for the opponents of the Georgians. After mass distribution to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Russian passports both impoverished self-proclaimed republics were completely depopulated - the mass migration to Russia, to Turkey in search of work and better life. According to international observers from the OSCE and the UN, today there are less than 30 thousand Ossetians left in South Ossetia, and in Abkhazia, out of 140 thousand permanent population, only 30% are Abkhaz. The largest community in today's Abkhazia is Armenians, there are Russians and others, in the Gali region there are up to 50 thousand returning Georgians. But in power, in security forces entirely Abkhazians representing different clans, only slightly diluted by seconded Russian military specialists.
It is unlikely that forcibly mobilized citizens of non-titular peoples will selflessly fight en masse for the preservation of the Abkhaz ethnocracy. In Abkhazia, in peacetime, there are 4,500 people under arms; in case of war, up to 10 thousand more can be mobilized. The Ossetians have up to 3,000 permanent troops, and virtually the entire mobilization resource has moved to Russian territory. The Ossetians and Abkhazians have a lot of old artillery and armored vehicles, but in the event of a full-scale conflict, they will be able to independently solve only auxiliary tasks, but our military will actually have to fight and suffer losses almost from the first day, otherwise the self-proclaimed republics will very quickly crumble into dust.
But, according to the First Deputy Minister of Defense, General Alexander Kolmakov, the training and equipment of our troops and naval forces “corresponds to the level of the 60-70s of the twentieth century.” Therefore, it will be difficult for our undeformed armed forces to fight effectively on foreign territory, beyond the Caucasus ridge, impassable in winter and difficult to pass in summer.